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Researchers over the past few years have been concerned with representa­
tional equity for blacks and less affluent whites in the local government 
setting. Much of the research has focused on the electoral structure and 
the impact it has on representational equity. Many have concluded that 
representational equity for blacks is more likely to be achieved in cities 
with district rather than at-large councils.* These findings have coincided 
with a trend among large cities of the Sunbelt toward replacement of at* 
large with district elections. It would seem logical to suppose that greater 
black representation on city councils would imply greater satisfaction with 
and greater access to government by these minorities. The objective of 
this paper is to examine the impact of changes from at-large to district 
representation upon citizen satisfaction with city government, citizen's per­
ception of their own access to city government and upon their evaluations of
2the quality and the equity of the services that government provides* I will 
first review existing literature and then move to "secondary analysis" of 
data.
The at-large method of electing city council members was proposed by 
middle- and upper-class Americans during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries— during the Progressive era. At large elections were to act as the 
device which would destroy one of the Institutional bases for urban political 
machine domination by eliminating the feudalistic ties of the predominately 
white immigrant urban masses to the urban political machine. Proponents of
at-large systems hoped to establish apolitical* efficient, and business­
like city governments that would respond to over-all community needs and not
to the particularistic needs and interests of the various ethnic and economic
3communities. This meant taking government out of the hands of neighborhood 
and centralising it under the control of businessmen.
Two Important vehicles for this municipal reformism* the commission and
■ 4 ■ ■■■ -
city manager plans* both originated in the South. The first city in the
nation to Install a commission was Galveston* Texas* in 1901* and it spread
rapidly to other Texas and Southern cities. The Initiative for both plans
came from business groups who argued that a municipality was essentially a
business corporation and should be run according to business principles.
The at-large election and the nonpartisan ballot were associated with both
the commission and city-manager forms of government. A study of 50 cities
that had adopted the manager system by 1938 showed that 40 had at-large
elections.^ In cities that by 1930 had a population of 30,000 or more*
Daniel N. Gorden found that in I960, councilmen were elected at-large in
100 percent of the commission cities* in 76 percent of the manager cities*
but only in 22 percent of the "ultra formed" (ward-based) cities.^ At large
elections remain concentrated in the South. Albert Karnig had shown that
75 percent of Southern cities elect counclimen at large, compared to
84/ percent elsewhere.
Despite the lofty intentions of the "Good Government" reformers to 
run the city as a business with business principles* racism was intertwined 
with Progressive Reform particularly in the South. Poll tax payment, for 
example, as a requirement for voting clearly eliminated the blacks and poor 
whites from the voting populace. Other methods used to eliminate the black 
vote were intimidation* gerrymandering* literacy tests* and the party
primary system. With the move from ward-elections to at-large elections,
blacks and poor whites Were disadvantaged in their efforts to elect "one
of their own." Galveston, Texas* the birthplace of the commission movement*
provides an example of one of the effects of at-large election. The change
to at-large el*ctions occurred in 1895. Prior to 1891 the city had operated
under a mayor-council charter with twelve aldermen elected from wards. New charter
amendments initiated by busiaessmen— "the Good Government Club"— became
effective in 1891 and 1893. These amendments added four at-large seats. Tbs
Chamber of Commerce in 1895 proposed and passed a completely at-large council
of twelve members. Ten of the twelve members of the Good Government Club— typical
middle-class businessmen and a physician"— won.* 0 five winners citywide lost
their own wards. Conversely two members of the People's Ticket— the incumbant
council of longshoremen* bartenders* small businessmen* and a drayman* which
included a black— won.** The black Incumbent carried hia ward but was
defeated citywide leaving an all-white council in a town that was 22 percent 
12black. The implications are clear* While it may not have been so great 
a change in the racial content of the council* it was a dramatic chaise in the 
social class composition. This change brought on by at-large elections 
coupled with the reduced ranks of Black voters resulted in the dilution of 
the minority vote.
A massive Black initiative attempted to bring changes to the electoral
system* The Civil Rights Movement of the 1980's succeeded in removing overt*
legal restrictions from black political participation* but it failed to bring
about black political representation commensurate with the site of the Black 
13population. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 attempted to prevent new struc­
ture! change calculated to dilute the black vote or limit the effectiveness
of black political power* Prohibitions were placed on gerrymandering, on
changes to multlmember districts or at-large voting, and on the creation of
14 ' 'substantial filing fees.
the NAACP Legal Defense fund has brought numerous suits claiming that
at-large elections violate the rights of blacks under the equal protection 
clause of the 14th Amendment by diluting black voting strength as well as by 
violating the Voting lights Acts of 1965. A recent case is the Bolden v.
City of Mobile case, Hie Golden v* City of Mobile ease was returned to a 
federal district court by the Supreme Court in April, 1980, after the Court
15
ruled that Mobile's commission/government was not unconstitutional* Pour 
justices argued that intent to discriminate must be shown before an electoral 
system can be deemed unconstitutional. In May, 1981, the Justice Department 
entered the case, claiming that discriminatory Intent was evident In Mobile 
election procedures,1^ A final decision is pending.
In the 1973 Zimmer v. McKeithen decision the Court of Appeals established
standards by which dilution of the minority vote could occur under the 1965
17 18Voting Rights Act. These standards included:
1 . lack of access to the process of slating candidate*;
2. unresponsiveness of legislators to their (minority) 
particularized interests;
3. a tenuous state policy underlying preference lot multi- 
member or at-large districting;
4. existence of past discrimination in general precludes 
effective participation in the election system.
While the court stated that not all these criteria need be satisfied in 
a successful dilution claim, the criterion of major interest is "unresponsive­
ness of legislators to their particularized Interests»" Use of the Zimnisr 
criteria has resulted in a number of successful law suits leading to the
= -  - - -  v
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conclusion that inequalities in the delivery of public services is part of
19
the "unresponsivenose" criteria.
In Bolden v. City of Mobile, the plaintiff argued that street maintenance
20
in black neighborhoods was inferior to that in white areas. The plaintiff
in Blacks United for a Lasting Leadership, Inc, v. Shreveport, as in Bolden v.
City of Mobilei claimed inequality in street maintenance. Jackson# Mississippi
■ 21 ■was also brought into court. In Kirksey v> City of Jackson# Mississippi#
claims brought against Jackson included discrimination in planning# toning,
22 ■street resurfacing and lighting# fire protection and parks. Finally# in 
Mallshaa v. Collins, the plaintiff argued that Tuscolooaa# Alabama# a city 
with at-large commission government, provides inferior quality and quantity 
of services to black residents in the areas of police and fire protection#
23
streets and solid waste collection. The questions arising f m suits is 
how widespread is this discrimination and does discrimination in services 
diminish with changes to district elections.
EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL STRUCTURE
Recently a variety oi studies have been conducted to determine the effect
of electoral structure on representational equity. Most of these studies
have concluded that equitable representation for black citteens in southern
cities depends heavily on the method by which the city governing body is
elected. Sixty percent of cities in 1960 with a population above 10,000
elected their councilman at large, while only 21 percent elected them solely from 
24districts* In cities of at least 5,000 population, most councilman in 
1971 were chosen at large and over twice as many cities elected some council- 
men by this method rather than entirely by ward. Less than 1 percent of council
'■■' .25 vmembers were Black, American Indian, Oriental, or Hispanic. The at-large 
system used by two/thirds of the cities seems to have a negative impact on black 
representation.
tn a study of 313 of the 385 American cities with populations over 
10,000 which were ac least 15 percent black in 1970, Hiellg and Mundt con­
cluded that the southern movements to districts is linked to increases in
26black representational equity. In 1970* 83*5 percent of the Southern 
and 54 percent of the nonsouthern cities elected councils at large. During 
the 1970vs, one-third of the southern cities changed from at-large to dis­
trict or mixed systems* and aonther 22 percent either experienced unsuccessful
attempts to establish districts or were in the midst of such efforts in
27late 1980. By using an equity ratio measure calculated by dividing the
percentage of blacks on council by the percentage of blacks in the population*
Heilig and Mundt found that southern district and mixed councils now have
28 ;equity scores almost equal to northern cities. This is a considerable
Increase over the equity score of the southern cities with at-large councils.
Davidson and JCorbel (1981) also concluded that single-member districts
afford minority groups a better chance for representation than at-large 
29elections. They found that minority representation Increased considerably 
in 21 Texas cities which during the 1970*8 switched from at-large to district 
or mixed systems. Engstrom and McDonald, using a regression-based analysis 
in which proportionality is treated as a relationship across cities with 
electoral structure as a specifying variable, also found at-large elections 
for city council seats discriminatory against blacks. They concluded that 
the electoral formatofa citybegins to make adifference when the black 
population constitutes around ten percent of a city’s population, and that
7-
the underrepresentation occurring in at-large cities becomes more acute as
the black population proportion increases. However, if the percentage of
blacks is less than 15 percent, income becomes the most Important variable
30in representation.
Margaret Latimer conducted a study of 80 cities of over 10,090 popula- 
tion to identify and measure the significant causal variables which affect 
black representation in Alabama, Louisiana and South Carolina cities. She 
found that only 11 percent of the cities have black representation in pro**
31
portion to their black population. Black representation In southern city
governments depends on the method by which the legislative body is elected*
District election of councllmen enhances representational equity. Increased
site of the governing body also increases black representation, especially
in cases of at-large election. The areas of higher black population have a
greater likelihood of equitable representation. Occupation and income
variations appear to have some importance due to the effect it has cm black
32political participation.
Albert K. Karnig found that blacks are generally underrepresented on
American city councils, and that southern cities provide the least equitable
" 3 3  .
penetration rate. He writes that part of the reason for the lower repre­
sentation ratio in the south is the overwhelming adoption of at-large voting
below the Mason-Dlscon Line— 75 percent of the southern cities, but only
3447 percent of the northern cities. Karnig found that district elections 
and increasing black socioeconomic factors increase representation for 
blacks through council penetration*
H a c k  economic resources signal the availability of money, time, and
skill which can be deployed in an effective political campaign,?*
■ ,  . j .-■ • • Hfifei
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paradox here is that where blacks have more resources, they can convert 
them into public-sector representation. These blacks however who possess
a greater level of resources generally need the representation less. The
poorer black communities, who are most in need of fair council representa­
tion, are the ones least likely to gain representation through council 
penetration.
Given the fact that blacks are numerical minorities in all but a few 
cities, even if black council members are proportionately elected to the
council, they will still constitute a minority. Karnig suggests that their
lbvote will be neutralized by the white majority. Black majorities on the 
council will be a result of black majorities in the city. This minority 
status of blacks together with tin* urban financial crisis will lead to few
policy changes even If blacks are proportionately elected to the council.
Karnig found that district-based elections provide better representation
37for blacks on councils in both regions of the nation. At-large elections 
distill minority power. Mundt and Heilig drew similar conclusions in a study 
on district representation in the urban south. They attempted to explain 
why efforts to establish district elections occurred in some southern cities 
but not in others. A strong link between representational equity and pro­
district attempts was found. Past underrepresentation increases the desire 
of black leader hip to replace biased election systems with one offering
greater opportunities for election for blacks. When there has been no
black representation, efforts to establish districts were much more likely
where the income differential between blacks and overall community was 
38large. This relationship between the income gap and district atteap&sis
conditional depending upon the level of past representation.
ttMii
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and past representation are related to pro-dtstrlct actions in an inter­
southern cities where they constitute at least 15 percent of the population*
Efforts to adopt districts were found to occur more often in larger than in
smaller cities without past black represnetation however* City sire had an
Independent effect when blacks have served on councils. However, regardless
of city size, lack of representation influences pro-district efforts.
Mundt and Heilig also used equity scores to study the representational
effect of changing from at-large to district elections. They found that the
equity scores for cities where there was a change to district elections
increased from an average of .145 before districts to an average score of 
40.776. This is a striking difference from the average equity score of .38
for cities with at-large elections and which experienced no district efforts,
the .205 average for cities where efforts failed, and the .257 scores in
41cities currently experiencing pro-district movements. They also found
that cities which had changed to only district elections, the average equity
score was .909. For cities which changed to mixed systems including both
42district and at-large seats, the average equity score was .68. It ii 
clear that district elections Increase representation for blacks.
Jones study of 272 cities supports these findings. Black Americans are 
underrepresented on city councils. At-large systems are institutional 
barriers to Black political representation. This study supports the adoption 
of the following election system reforms if Black representation on city 
councils is to be Increased: (1) replacement of at-large systems with
district systems, especially in the South and Hortheast; (2) increasing th#'
39active manner. Blacks have been elected to councils in most larger
10-
number of council seats; if elimination of at-large systems is not polit­
ically feasible; and (3) decreasing the district size in cities utilizing
43the district system. The evidence shows that method of electing city 
councils, especially number of council seats in at-large systems affect 
Black political representation.
RESULTS OF SHIFTS TO DISTRICT REPRESENTATION
Since 1970, over twenty percent of all southern cities with populations
over 10,000 and which are at least fifteen percent black have changed from
at-large to district or mixed systems combining district and at-large seats.
In another sixteen percent of these cities, district attempts have failed or
44are taking place at the present time. wfhile changes to districts have 
been shown to promote greater equity for blacks, this change does not 
necessarily mean changes in local politics and policies. Black absence or 
presence on city councils may or may not be an accurate reflection of Black 
political influence. Black presence on a city council does, however, 
indicate Black political accomplishment in the area of placing a Black in 
public office. It may also indicate a degree of institutional responsive­
ness to minority interests in that particular city.
Finally, Heilig and Mundt conducted a study of ten large cities to see
45if the change to districts affected the cities1 policies and procedures.
In each city there was a change in government form from at-large to districts. 
After studying the city councils' roll call and member interactions, they 
found that in some of the cities, district representation was instrumental 
in creating new lines of conflict and new voting coalitions. In others, 
however, council coalitions depended on factors such as ethnic conflict,
class-based groups, and ’’insiders" versus "outsiders." They concluded 
that it may be more accurate to view the change to districts as simply a 
result of shifts in community power, rather than a cause of change in 
either process or policy,^
CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PEORIA
After an independent case study of Peoria, Illinois, my data supported
the conclusions drawn by Heilig and Mundt, Peoria has changed governmental
structure, including type of council representation, three times since 
471951. During the 1970’s, it was a deviant case, adding at-large represen­
tation at a time when no other large city was moving in that direction.
In 1951, a partisan mayor/district council system was replaced by a 
non-partisan manager/at-large council government. This change resulted from 
a classic "reform" campaign against corruption and inefficiency (Martin, 
1974). However, politicians of both parties with strong followings in 
Peoria’s then-populous working class areas led a successful drive for re- 
adoption of a partisan, district council. This change was made by referendum 
in 1960,
Politics and government in Peoria became particularly chaotic and 
conflictual following the election of a new mayor and council in 1969,
The ten-district council included five members elected with the grass roots 
support of a conversatively oriented group which had organised to fight the 
imposition of a utility tax. These five members often voted in a bloc. The 
other councilmen were not as closely allied, but actions by their colleagues 
often seemed to create a second bloc, and, in specific situations, one of 
the more progressive members worked at coalition-building. In addition,
- 12-
the new mayor, a neophyte to public office troubled with personal problems, 
never gained control of council meetings* Heated arguments, personal insults 
and other unseemly exchanges became standard fare during council proceedings* 
The League of Women Voters took advantage of the council's problems to 
argue once more for at-large representation. In 1972, the League organised 
a successful referendum campaign which resulted . adoption of the current 
mixed system of five district and three at-large r vresentatives*
Peoria now has a Council-Manager form of municipal government but also 
has an elected mayor. The Mayor and the Councilmen are elected on a non­
partisan basis for staggered, four-year terms* The Mayor is elected from 
the city at large. He presides at mi. Council meetings and has one vote 
but no veto. He, with the approval of the Council,has appointive powers for 
nearly eighty boards and commissions. Eight Councilmen, one from each of 
five districts plus three at-large, are elected and have one vote each* They 
and the Mayor constitute the policy-making body of the City with the power 
to hire and fire a city manager. The city manager is the administrative 
head of the city. He Is hired by the City Council to carry out its policy 
directives in the administration of the various departments* The city 
has many appointed boards and commissions which advise, assist and are 
accountable to the City Council. For example, the Police Pension Bosrd, 
the Fire and Police Commission, the Election Commission, the Planning 
Commission, Zoning Commission, Zoning Board of Appeals, Housing Commission, 
Community Redevelopment Commission and the newly created Peoria Civic Center
Commission all play vital roles in city management* There are also many 
commissions and boards with very little influence iti the city. These
commissions serve the very important function of making the cltisene feel
they are part of government. The Department of Public Works is also 
under the City Councilfs jurisdiction. This includes the Street Division, 
Sewer Division, Equipment Division, and the Engineering Division. The 
City has an Inspections department, traffic engineering department, police 
department and a fire department. Garbage pick-up and disposal is a City 
service} however, there is no department for this service, since the job 
is done by a private firm under contract to the City.
As in many other cities, there are essentially three sections ot 
Peoria. The "valley" which is the downtown city and the poor areas bor­
dering it, the "bluff" area which is the next layer or middle layer— once 
affluent sections of the city and finally, the more newly-developed "fringe 
areas." Edeh area has its different interests and demands. The Valley 
residents want more and better personal services, more jobs, more resources, 
etc. The Bluff residents want more of the Federal great money being put 
to use for special programs benefitting their area, while fringe area 
residents want more services reaching their area such as a new firehouse, 
busline, etc*
Looking back to the 1981 city council elections, different issues 
wefe stressed by council candidates in each district, In the second dis­
trict or Valley area much concern was given to the development and urban 
renewal projects that the city had begun. Valley residents felt that too 
little attention Was given to the needs of the individuals and the small 
busimesemen. The residents were tired of the tearing down, rebuilding, 
and relocating* they supported more citizen input into the redevelopment 
planning, work available for all who wanted to work, maintaining rather 
than curtailing police and fire services, and building up their neighborhoods
w ’th grocery stores and drug-stores rather than moving the people out of 
the neighborhood. The Bluff residents believed that they, the homeowners, 
were the hardest hit by the property taxes, the city’s reassessment 
policies, and a citywide multiplier. They wanted this evened out through­
out the city. These Bluff residents wanted pul lie input from the city 
traffic planning division to solve their current traffic problems. Also, 
they were concerned with preserving the historical buildings, theatres, 
lights, etc. for it added to the "charm" of that area. The Fringe residents 
were mainly concerned with zoning in their district, particularly setting 
up the city’s first "thoroughfare zoning" ordinance to deal with the so- 
called "stop and strip" zoning. They supported basing federal revenue 
sharing funds for new firefighting equipment and a new firehouse. They 
were very supportive of the downtown redevelopment programs but also 
wanted more access to government.
Despite different desires and concerns in various areas of the 
city, the council decisions are typically unanliiious. This supports the 
notion t'.iat since the council has changed towards at-large elections, 
there will be greater unity within the council. However, there are five 
district seats. The council wilt from the black and lower-income areas tend 
in most issues to vote with the *$ayor and other council men. City council 
policy decisions may not be greatly affected by the racial or socio­
economic make-up of the council. In this city, a change it* election 
structure did not mean a change if* policy or policy procedures. However, 
symbolic benefits to blacks may Stilt M F C  been present«
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CHANGE IN ROLE ORIENTATIONS
The adoption of district elections has clearly resulted in increased
proportions of blacks serving on southern city councils. This adoption
of district elections and the election of blacks to the council may have
tremendous symbolic benefits but does not necessarily bring about a
change in local politics, procedures or policy. Hellig and Mundt's
intensive study of ten cities which adopted districts showed that unless
minority representatives (racial or socioeconomic) comprise a council
majority* or unless they become part of a majority coalition, district
48representation will have few direct effects on policy outcomes. They 
also concluded that even If. blacks and low Income whiter are more satisfied 
under district systems, such satisfaction can not seriously be linked gen­
erally to council decisions concerning distribution of public goods and 
services.^
An important factor which docs eh nge with the adoption of di uriet
elections is the role orientations ot >un i1 members elected by different
constituencies, yahlke, Evlau, et a 1. , di cussed role orelntations* or
50styles of represen* tim, in t ms ot die < elegate and trustee models. 
Several ■ cengr^siona 1 si u*aie» > Mayhew (174), Fiovina (1977) and Fenno
(1971) suggest the .necessity i adding a third model of the representational
51role— ‘that of ombudsman, jrlegates make decisions in line with consti­
tuent wishes and are concerned that their ; ‘OgrapT d constituencies ’
I
receive a sufficient share ot public goods tnd services.. Trustees decide 
on the basis of their own judgement of dial is best tar the entire city.
The ombudsties concept Implies an emphas•s u on serving individual members
of a constituency in largely personal* noncontroversial ways.
Heilig and Nundt also studied the relationship between role orlen-
52tations and the type of council election. They expected district 
representatives to differ from at-large representatives with respect to 
their role orientations. Since district representatives have fewer con­
stituents, they will be known by more constituents and will have the 
opportunity to see and hear their concerns. They"will predictably adopt 
the role of ombudsmen. Heilig and Mundt hypothesised that (1) district 
representatives identify themselves as ombudsmen or delegates while at-large 
members see themselves as trustees and (2) district members have more
53
citizen-initiated contacts with constituents than do at-large members.
After interviewing those council members of all the cities who had
served during the three terms preceding the change to districts and during
all terras, they found that their hypothesis incorrectly linked represen-
54
tatlon of any district with an ombudsman role deflation. It is only in 
less affluent districts where this relationship holds. District wealth 
was linked with role orientations.
district representatives elected from nonaffluent areas— ^whether 
white •' black districts— described themselves as either ombudsmen, 
responsible tor providing assistance to individual constituents, or as
55delegates, responsible for seeing that their area is treated "fairly.11
TABid- 1 HERE
As Tab 1 hows, this sharpl’ contrasts with the trustee orientation
selected y most at-large com oil members but also by district
56representati' 1 fluent areas. Over 80 percent of the at-large members 
and nearly 90 percept those from upp, im.ome districts saw themselves as
- 16-
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trustees; only 5 percent of the council members from the less affluent districts
had this orientation.**^ Income is the key variable in understanding how
urban constituencies with district systems are being represented— council
members select representational styles in line with the socio-economic
58context of their district. Council members elected by affluent dis­
tricts as well as those elected at-large take on the role of trustee.
They focus on large issues and tend to feel that their election to the 
council is unrelated to the personal needs of the constituent. Councilmen 
from middle class districts tend to take on the delegate or ombudsmen 
role focusing on the service needs of district. The councilmen from the 
poorest areas tend to take on the role of ombudsmen and deal with the most 
personalised needs of the constituent. Role orientation* according to
Heilig and Mundt, is linked not to district representation per se, but to
59the income level of the district. The question that follows from this 
research is whether the citizens are happy with these role orientations 
and therefore happy or satisfied with their city government.
LITERATURE ON -CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Two major studies have been conducted dealing with citizen attitudes
toward local government. The Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan in 1968 conducted a fifteen-city study at the request of the
60National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The cities included 
in the study were Baltimore* Boston* Brooklyn, Chicago, Gincinattl* 
Cleveland* Detroit, Gary* Milwaukee, Newark* Ehiladelfiiiia* St. Louis*
San Francisco* and Washington. Analysis of the data focused on white 
attitudes toward blacks and black political action or on attitudes
. . . . .  ... 1...  . . . .  ........ . . .  ......;V
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toward local services, local officials, and local government. Various
studies have been conducted using this data.
Sehuman and Greenberg found that blacks were more dissatisfied than
whites with neighborhood schools, parks and playgrounds, police protection
61and garbage collection. This racial difference in satisfaction occurred 
in all fifteen. The cities however varied in overall levels of dissatisfac­
tion. 24 percent of the black respondents believed that their neighborhoods 
received lower quality services than other neighborhoods. 10 percent of 
the whites believed that their neighborhoods received lower quality 
services. The differences in levels of satisfaction were not large hut 
were consistent and statistically significant.
Aberbach and Walker used only the Detroit sample of the study for 
62thoir research. They found that 45 percent of the blacks compared to 
29 percent of the whites felt that city officials would do nothing if 
they complained about a serious problem. Those blacks who had made com­
plaints to city officials were found to be less expectant of a response 
than those whites who had made complaints. Aberbach and Walker also 
found blacks to be more concerned with police abuse than whites. The 
Inadequacy of the police force however was not a racial issue*
The final study using the University of Michigan data was done by 
63Rossi and Berk. Rossi and Berk added data from Interviews with local 
elites and “institutional agents’* such as teachers, welfare workers and 
police officers to the University of Michigan data. From this combined 
data they found links between blacks* ratings of mayors, elite judgements 
of mayors* sympathies toward blacks, and blacks' confidence that requests 
for improvements in services would be met.
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Host recent research supports the notion that a switch to district elec­
tions will promote representational equity by increasing the number of 
minorities— “one of our own”— on the council. It would seem logical to 
assume that: if the minority groups had their own person on the council
that they will have more positive feelings toward city government and will 
also feel more able to influence what is done by government; that the 
Increased representation will result in increased benefits to formerly 
underrepresented areas or groups that the residents of such areas and
members of such groups will exhibit increased satisfaction with the outputs
67of their city government. The objective of this research is to examine 
the relationship between establishment of geographically based systems of 
representation, attitudes of citizens concerning their access to city 
government and their evaluation of the quality and equity of the city 
services they receive as well as their satisfaction with government and 
its services.
DATA TO BE ANALYZED
For this study, the data collected by Heilig will be used. The 
data was drawn from a survey conducted by Heilig of 1007 randomly selec­
ted residents of fifty southern cities with populations between 10»000
68and 50,000 and which are at least 15 percent black. These cities were 
selected because of their recent political histories. Nineteen of them 
changed from at-large to district or mixed councils during the 1970's. 
Another sixteen cities are all of those within their size range which 
experienced unsuccessful district efforts during the 1970's. These cities
- 21-
continue to elect their councils at-large. Fifteen cities were randomly 
selected from 38 cities of this size which had at-large councils in 1970 
and which experienced no pro-district efforts during that decade.
A preliminary analysis of data shows no differences between the 
responses of those persons living in at-large cities which had unsuccess­
ful district efforts and those in at-large cities with no district efforts.^ 
Consequently* for purposes of this study, the sample will be divided only 
by those persons living in at-large cities and by those living in district 
cities.
Small cities were utilized for several reasons.^ First, the environ­
ment of small cities which adopted Experimental) and which did not adopt 
(control) districts are more likely to be similar than would be the case 
with large cities. Second, their smaller scale of government makes it 
more likely that changes in service or in the characteristics or orienta­
tions of officials will be noticed and evaluated by residents. Three, 
Increases in black membership on the councils of the experimental cities 
was substantial. The measure of representational equity used was deter­
mined by dividing the percentage of black council members by the percentage 
of blacks in the population.^ A value of ”1“ indicates equity, values 
below ”1” indicate underrepresentation and values above ’’l” Indicate 
overrepresentation. The average 1970’s equity score of the experimental 
cities before the adoption of districts was .035. This indicates almost 
no black council membership. After districts were established the equity 
score for the experimental cities rose to * 759. Hi is indicates a substan­
tial Increase in black council membership.^
The questions asked of the respondents used for this study focused 
on their satisfaction with local government, on their views concerning 
whether local officials cared about them and on their contacts with 
their council members. (See Appendix A for a listing of the questions 
used. )
A secondary data set will also be used— the 1982 Illinois Poll. The 
Illinois Poll is a semiannual random telephone survey of Illinois residents 
conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory, University of Illinois - 
Urbana-Champaign. For this study, the sample will be divided by Chicago, 
by Chicago Suburbs and outstate cities and towns.
HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED
Based on the assumptions stated earlier, the following hypothesis will
74be tested in this study:
(1) Blacks in cities which have recently established district 
representation will be more satisfied with local government than will their 
counterparts in at-large cities.
(2) Blacks in cities which have recently established district repre­
sentation will be less likely to feel that their neighborhoods are treated 
unfairly by local government than their counterparts in at-large cities.
(3) Blacks in cities which have recently established district 
representation will have more frequent contact with council members than 
will their counterparts in at-large cities.
TEST RESULTS
Neither the Southern survey nor the Illinois poll supports the 
hypothesis that blacks in district cities will be more satisfied than
- 23-
those in at-large cities. In fact, the respondents from both surveys with 
the exception of Chicago were very satisfied with their government (See 
Table 2). In the Southern survey, 77.2 percent of the blacks from district
TABLE 2 HERE
cities were satisfied and 80.0 percent of the blacks from at-large cities 
were satisfied. Whites in the Southern survey were reportedly more 
satisfied than blacks, and whites in district cities were no less satisfied 
than those in at-large cities (see Table 3). Eighty-eight percent of the
TABLE 3 HERE
whites in district cities and 83.1 percent of the whites in at-large cities 
were satisfied with their government. These findings contradict those 
found in studies which found blacks to be much less satisfied with govern­
ment than whites. (See University of Michigan, Urban Observatory 1970 
study, Schuman and Greenberg, Aberbach and Walker, Rossi and Berk). Blacks 
were equally satisfied with the two forms of government.
Data from the Illinois poll reveal a different conclusion. While 
cutstate Illinois respondents were generally satisfied with their govern­
ment no matter what form it was, Chicago respondents were different,
Heitor blacks or whites were particularly satisfied. Black respondents 
wer less satisfied than either the black respondents in the Southern 
survey or outstate Illinois survey (see Table 4).
TABLE 4 HERE
White respondents trom Chicago were not very satisfied either. 
Chicago has a ward based election system. It would be expected that 
black as well as white satistaction would be high. Aa Table 4 indicates, 
this is not the case. Sixty-eight percent of the black respondents and 
51.1 percent of the white respondents were not satisfied.
Ill i l l - - *» I - • vv:>. ft
These low levels of satisfaction with government probably are not 
functions of electoral structure. Chicago is an extremely large city with 
very intense local politics. These factors combined with perhaps unrealis­
tic expectations of government may lead to reported dissatisfaction with 
government. It should also be noted that the only blacks in the Illinois 
Poll were those from Chicago.
Outstate Illinois respondents (Chicago Suburbs and downstate cities 
and towns) surveyed in the Illinois Poll had satisfaction levels close to 
those found in the Southern survey (see Table 5). Of the outstate
TABLE 5 HERE
respondents, 75.6 percent were satisfied with their at-large government, 
while 75.2 percent of the outstate respondents were satisfied with dis­
trict governments. Once again, electoral structure did not seem to have 
an effect on citizen satisfaction with city government.
When the outstate respondent data is further analyzed, it leads to 
the conclusion that respondents from the suburbs are slightly more satisfied 
with government than are the respondents from downstate cities and towns. 
Satisfaction levels were not linked to electoral structure (see Tables 6 
and 7). For respondents from the Chicago suburbs, 80.8 percent of the
TABLE 6 AND TABLE 7 HERE
respondents from at-large suburbs were satisfied while 85.0 percent from 
district suburbs were satisfied. For respondents from outstate cities 
and towns, the satisfaction level was lower than that of the suburb 
resondents* The satisfaction levels for the cities and town were comparable 
66.7 percent of the respondents were satisfied with at-large governments 
while 68.8 percent were satisfied with district governments. Once again.
it should be noted that all of the respondents in the Chicago suburbs 
and downstate cities and towns were white.
The second hypothesis for this study was that blacks who lived in 
cities which have recently established district representation will be 
less likely to feel that their neighborhoods are treated unfairly by 
local government than their counterparts in at-large cities. Both the 
Southern survey and the Illinois Poll showed that blacks in district 
cities do not necessarily have more positive attitudes towards treatment 
of their neighborhoods than blacks in at-large cities* The greatest 
majority of respondents reported their neighborhoods as being treated 
at least the same as other areas. Electoral structure had no effect 
on respondents evaluations of their own neighborhoods. Districts do not 
lead to improved attitudes on the part of blacks.
Results of the Southern Survey show that regardless of electoral 
structure, blacks believe that their neighborhoods are treated unfairly 
more frequently than white respondents. This difference Is not statis­
tically significant however (see Table 8). The greatest majority of both
TABLE 8 HERE
blacks and whites responding to the Southern survey believe their neighbor­
hood treatment to be the same as other areas (see Table 9).
TABLE 9 HERE
While the hypothesis was made that blocks from district cities would 
have a more positive attitude towards their areas* treatment than blacks 
from at-large cities, this was not the case In this survey (see Table 8). 
Seventy-three percent of the black respondents from district cities believed 
the treatment of their neighborhood to be the same as other areas.
- 26-
Elghty-four percent of the black respondents frow at-large c i t i e s  believed 
this to be the case. It appears that the blacks in the cities which 
adopted districts were more likely to say that their neighborhoods receive 
worse treatment than are blacks in cities which remained at-large* This 
is exactly opposite to the hypothesis presented.
In Illinois, attitudes toward neighborhood treatment vary. Once 
again it should be noted that the only blacks in the Illinois Poll Were 
in Chicago. The size and kind of city made a difference as to citizen's 
attitudes towards the treatment of their neighborhood, not electoral 
structure as expected.
Chicago respondents would be expected because of their ward based 
election system to have relatively positive attitudes toward their neigh­
borhood's treatment. What was found, however, was that blacks responding 
in Chicago were not very positive in their attitudes towards their 
neighborhoods (see Table 10). Forty-five percent of the black respondents
TABLE 10 HERE
in Chicago believed that their neighborhoods were treated worse than 
other neighborhoods. This is a considerably higher percentage than was 
found for blacks in either the Southern survey or outstate Illinois analysis. 
The white respondents' attitudes were considerably more positive. These 
results from Chicago are probably related to city size, racial distribution, 
city politics, and unrealistic expectations not to electoral structure.
Outstate Illinois respondents responded very positively and similarly 
regardless of whether they were from at-large or district cities (see 
Table 11). Ninety percent of at-large respondents and 91.0 percent of
TABLE 11 HERE
district respondents believed their neighborhoods received the same or 
better treatment than other neighborhoods. Electoral structure had no 
impact on attitudes as was once again expected. A comparison of Chicago 
suburbs and Outstate cities and towns reveals very similar results 
(see Tables 12 and 13). Respondents from at-large governments in both
TABLE 12 AND TABLE 13 HERE
suburbs and outstate cities and towns believed their neighborhoods to be 
treated the same at a rate of 90.4 percent and 91.8 percent respectively. 
Respondents from district governments varied slightly in their responses, 
with 95 percent cf suburb respondents and 88.3 percent of outstate city 
and town respondents giving this response. Once again our hypothesis 
was disproved.
The final hypothesis for this study was that blacks in cities which 
have recently established district representation will have more frequent 
contact with council members than will their counterparts in at-large 
cities. What was found when looking at the results of the Southern survey 
was that electoral structure made only a slight difference in whether 
contact was or was not made with the councilmen for blacks. Black res­
pondents to the Southern survey had a very low contact rate regardless of 
electoral structure. White contact rate was the sane regardless of 
electoral structure (see Table 14).
TABLE 14 HERE
Hore blacks from district cities did have contact with councilmen 
than blacks from at-large cities but the percentages were very low. 
Thirty-nine percent of those blacks responding from district cities had 
contact while 22.3 percent from at-large cities had contact.
- 28-
White respondents, however, had comparable contact rates (see 
Table 15). Fifty-two percent of those whites responding to the Southern
TABLE 15 HERE
survey from district cities had contact with counciImen while 54 percent 
from at-large cities had contact. What was found in the Southern survey 
was not particularly supportive of our hypothesis. Black contact is very 
seldom made with councilmen but electoral structure seems to have a slight 
impact on this.
Chicago representatives to the Illinois poll also reported 1 w con­
tact rates. The black contact rate and the white contact rate were 
equal at 31 percent (see Table 16). Outstate respondents had a higher
TABLE 16 HERE
contact rate than the Chicago respondents. In this instance, respondents 
from district cities reported a slightly higher contact rate than respon­
dents from at-large cities (see Table 17). Forty-seven percent of the
TABLE 17 HERE
district respondents as compared to 43 percent of the at-large respondents 
reported having made contact with councilmen. The difference in the rates 
is too small to be conclusive however.
An analysis of the contact rates between the Chicago suburbs and 
outstate cities and towns also indicates a slightly higher contact rate 
for district respondents than for at-large respondents (see Tables 18 and 19)
TABLES 18 AND TABLES 19 HERE
The contact rates for the suburb respondents and outstate respondents are 
once again very similar. It should be noted that the only blacks in the 
Illinois Poll ft .m Chicago. It seems obvious from the Southern survey
29
data and from the Illinois poll data that whites make contact with their 
eouncllmen more often. No correlation was found, however, between con­
tact and electoral structure as was hypothesized.
Clx* implication arising from the desire for increased contact is that 
if there is opportunity for contact and contact is made, then the citizens 
will be more satisfied. The data from the Southern Survey finds this not 
to be the case. Contact with city councilmen had no impact on respondent 
satisfaction or on their attitudes toward their neighborhood in comparison 
to other neighborhoods.
Of the Black respondents to the Southern poll who reported they were 
satisfied, 74.5 percent had previously made contact with their councilmen. 
80.3 percent of the satisfied respondents had never made contact with 
their councilmen (see Table 20). The white respondents to the Southern
TABLE 20 HERE
poll were generally more satisfied with the city government than were the 
blacks. The percentage of those satisfied with government was the same 
for those who had made contact and were satisfied and for those who had 
not made contact and were satisfied (see Table 21).
TABLE 21 HERE
What was found from this survey was that there is no relatiouchip 
between contact and citizen satisfaction with government. For bl •it. k 8, 
the persons who had never made contact reported being the most laiisfied. 
This could be for any number of reasons.
SUMMARY
Based on the study which was conducted here using the Southern 
survey data and the Illinois Poll, several conclusions can be drawn.
First, regardless of race or type of council, city residents are satisfied 
with their government. District representation had no impact upon satis­
faction reported by blacks. Second, the vast majority of each group 
felt that their neighborhoods are treated fairly by the city, receiving 
the same treatment as other areas. Contrary to expectation, blacks in 
district cities were more likely than blacks in at-large cities to say 
their neighborhoods receive worse treatment than other parts of the city. 
Third, the electoral structure of a city had very little to do with the 
amount of contact with councilmen. Finally, the most satisfied citizens 
were found equally to be those citizens who have contact with city 
officials, and those citizens who do not.
After analyzing this data and available literature, I conclude that 
contrary my expectations electoral structure simply has no impact 
upon citizen satisfaction with local government. The major effects of 
adopting districts are increased proportions of blacks serving on city 
councils and increased proportions of ombudsman and local delegate role 
orientations. Only if districts result in the selection of a black 
council majority will major policy changes occur. If these policy changes 
do occur, perhaps then citizen satisfaction will be more directly related
to electoral structure.
APPENDIX A
Data were drawn from responses to the following questions:
From the Summer 1982 Illinois Poll
In general, how satisfied are you with your city or town government? Would 
you say you are*..(Very Satisfied/Satisfied/Disaatisfied/Very 
Dissatisfied/DK)
Thinking about all the services your town provides, how do you think the 
services in your neighborhood compare with other parts of town? Would you 
say that your neighborhood gets better service, about the same or worse 
service?
If you had a complaint about poor services, who would you contact? (Open 
end)
Have you ever had any contact with a member of your city or town council?
Do you believe that the members of your council care what people like you 
think?
From the Southern City survey:
In general, how satisfied are you with your city government? Would you say 
you are...(Very SatIsfied/Satisfled/Dlssatisfied/Very Dissatisfied/DK)
Thinking about all the services your city provides, how do you think the 
services in your neighborhood compare with other parts of the city? Would 
you say that your neighborhood gets better service, about the same, or 
worse service?
If you had a complaint about poor city services, who would you contact? 
(Mayor/City Manager/Council Member/Department Head/Other)
Have you ever had any contact with a member of your city council?
Was this contact... (answer all that apply)
a. To complain about poor service
b. To request additional service
c. To state your opinion on some issue
d. To campaign for the candidate
e. For some other reason (specify)
■M.'  :a a A -  ■ ■ ■ WMA
TABLE 1
ROLE ORIENTATION BY COUNCIL CONSTITUENCY, TEN CITIES ADOPTING DISTRICTS*
CONSTITUENCY
DISTRICTS
ORIENTATION LOW INCOME MIDDLE INCOME UPPER INCOME AT-LARGE
Trustee 5.3 57.1 87.5 82.4
Delegate 42.1 28.6 12.5 13.7
Ombudsman 52.6 14.3 0.0 3.9
(N) 19 28 24 51
it
As developed by HellIg and Mundt
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE
All Blacks in Southern Survey
District At-Large
Satisfied 77.2 80,0
(142) (128)
Not Satisfied 22.8 20.0
(42) (32)
RELATIONSHIP
TABLE 3
BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE 
All Whites in Southern Survey
District At-Large
Satisfied 88.0 85.1
(309) (292)
Not Satisfied 12.0 14.9
(42) (51)
ivi ». f e s 1' r/simii+'-kiZ&ii ■ . - n C , : K S  /
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND RACE 
FOR CHICAGO RESPONDENTS
TABLE 4
Whites Blacks
Satisfied 48.9 31.1
(92) (33)
Not Satisfied 51.1 68.9
(96) (73)
TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL 
STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE RESPONDENTS
At-Large District
Satisfied 75.6 75.2
(124) (118)
Not Satisfied 24.4 24.8
(40) (39)
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL 
STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS
TABLE 6
At-large District
Satisfied 80*8 85.0
(84) (51)
Not Satisfied 19.2 15.0
(20) ( 9)
TABLE 7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AIR) ELECTORAL 
STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE CITIES AND TOWNS
Satisfied
At-Large District
66.7 68.8
(40) (66)
33.3 31.3
(20) (30)
Not Satisfied
All Blacks in Southern Survey
Neighborhood Comparison
TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES
Electoral Structure Better Same Worse
District 5,0 73.3 21.7
(9) (132) (39)
At*-Large 6.3 83.7 10.0
(10) (126) (15)
TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES
All Whites in Southern Survey
Neighborhood Comparison
Electoral Structure Better Same Worse
District 8.1 84.4 7.5
(29) (303) (27)
At-Large 10.5 82.2 7.3
(36) (282) (25)
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Neighborhood Comparison Whites Blacks
Better 80.7 54.8
(146) (57)
forse 19.3 45.2
(35) (47)
TABLE 10
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND RACE IN CHICAGO
TARLE 11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE
RESPONDENTS
Neighborhood Comparison At-Larne District
Better 90.9 91.0
(150) (141)
Worse 9.1 9.0
TABLE 12
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITU! KS AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS
Ne i ghborh ood Compa ri son At-Large District
Better 9 6 .4 95,0
(94) (57)
Worse* 9.6 5,0
(.10) <»
TABLE 13
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE C It IBS,
AND TOWNS
Neighborhood Comparison At-Large District
Better 91.8 88,3
(S6) (83)
Wor^e 8.2 51 . /
(5) (11)
T M L E  14
All Blacks in Southern Survey
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE
District At-Large
Contact with CounciImen 38.6 22.3
(76) (30)
No Contact with
CoUtlc i 1 tm*n 61.4 77*7
(121) (136)
TABLE 15
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE
All Whites in Southern Survey
District At*Large
Contact with CouncIlmen 51.9 54.3
(193) ( 197)
No Contact with
Li Hf pc Ilmen 48.1 45.7
(179) (166)
TABLE 16
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND RACE FOR CHICAGO RESPONDENTS
White* Blacks
Contact with Councilman 31,9 31.2
(61) (34)
No Contact with
Councilmen 68.1 68.8
(130) (75)
TABLE 17
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE
RESPONDENTS
: At-Large District
Contact viwh Councilman 43.2 46.5
(73) (24)
Wo Contact with 
Councilman 5B.S yyiMtk-.::.
(M) («5)
■ * - /• ^ 4:;- ->__‘lx..*... . IPiis
TABLE 18
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS
At-Large District
Contact with Councilman 44.3 47.5
(47) (29)
No contact with
CouncIlmen 55.7 52.5
(59) (39)
TABLE 19
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE CITIES
AND TOWNS
At-Large District
Contact with Councilman 41.3 43.4
(26) (44)
So contact with
58.7 **♦4.. •
(3?)
TABLE 20
All Blacks la Southern Survay
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND CONTACT
Contact No Contact
Satisfied 74.5 80.3
<8i) (188)
Not Satisfied 25*5 19.7
(28) (46)
TABLE 21
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AM) CONTACT
All Whitej la Southern Survey
Contact Ho Contact
Satisfied 87.1 83.9
(331) (267)
Not Satisfied 12,9 H.l
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